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Funding Gideon 's Promise by
Viewing Excessive Caseloads as
Unethical Conflicts of Interest
by HEIDI REAMER ANDERSON*
Thou shalt not ration justice.
-Judge Learned Hand'
Introduction
State legislatures currently may negate a defendant's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel via a novel two-
step maneuver. First, the legislature may refuse to fund public
defender systems adequately, which inevitably burdens public
defenders with excessive caseloads. Excessive caseloads due to the
underfunding of public defenders have been the status quo for
decades; thus, this first step is nothing new.2 However, what is new-
and especially troubling-is what some legislatures are doing to hide
the unethical representation that results from inadequate funding. In
this second step, the same legislature that inadequately funds public
defense also bars a public defender from withdrawing from the
representation due to the excessive caseload created by the
legislature in the first step.'
The state's underfunding creates two types of conflicts for the
public defender: (i) a current client conflict, in which the number of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I owe many thanks to
Thomas Anderson, Krista Cammack, and Barrett Rodriguez for their helpful comments,
research assistance, and encouragement. Special thanks to Florida Coastal School of Law
for a generous summer research grant to support this project. All errors are my own.
1. 75th Anniversary Address to the Legal Aid Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951)
("If we are to keep our democracy there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not
ration justice.").
2. See infra Part I.A. (providing national overview of excessive caseload problem).
3. See infra Part I.B. (chronicling Florida's enactment of statute in response to
court's recognition of excessive caseload problems).
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other criminal defendant clients currently assigned to him "materially
limits" his ability to represent any one of his clients; and (ii) a
personal interest conflict, in which the lawyer's personal financial
interest in maintaining employment conflicts with the lawyer's duty to
report himself or others for failing to provide competent, diligent and
communicative representation.4 When the state legislature that
created the conflicts of interest through underfunding also states, by
statute, that its underfunded creation cannot be deemed an unethical
conflict of interest, the end result is a Catch-22 of sorts for defendants
and their public defenders. Specifically, criminal defendants are
further deprived of effective assistance of counsel while their own
counsel is prevented from doing anything about it.' Florida and
Colorado already have taken the two steps described above to
effectively legislate around the Sixth Amendment.6 With many state
budgets tighter than ever before, other states soon may follow Florida
and Colorado's lead.'
The significance of excessive caseload conflicts cannot be
overstated. Ninety-five percent of convictions are the result of plea
bargains.' Most defendants who plead guilty are represented by
public defenders.! If those public defenders are advising their clients
4. See infra Part III.A (illustrating how the excessive caseload conflict would fit
within existing ethical standards defining conflicts of interest).
5. In an admittedly stretched analogy, it is like Dr. Frankenstein creating his
monster and then devising a potion that prevents everyone from calling it a monster.
6. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-103(1.5) (b), (c)
(2009); see infra Part I.B; see also Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in
Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L.
REV. 885, 887 (2010) (noting that the Florida and Colorado statutes prohibiting
withdrawals based on excessive caseload "stan[d] alone in the nation").
7. See Heather Baxter, Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of
Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 353-54 (2010) (reporting recent cuts to
indigent funding, such as a more than seventy-percent decrease in Georgia's Northern
Judicial Circuit); Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing
Crisis of Excessive Caseloads, THE CHAMPION, June 2009, at 22, 22, available at
http://www.criminaljustice.org/Champion.aspx?id=14650 ("In the face of severe
government revenue shortfalls, indigent defense has been a favorite target for cost savings
at the expense of the constitutional rights of the poor in our courtrooms. This situation
has resulted in . . . excessive caseloads, and a lack of crucial resources such as expert
witnesses, investigative services, and mitigation and disposition specialists.").
8. See David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1539 (2011) (citing Jenny Roberts,
Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1136 (2004)).
9. See Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect
the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative
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to plead guilty while laboring under excessive caseload conflicts, they
repeatedly are failing to provide effective assistance of counsel
without any potential for the kind of post-hoc scrutiny available after
an actual trial."o
In this article, I suggest that courts effectively mandate adequate
funding to resolve the excessive caseload problem via their own two-
step comeback. First, courts should state more clearly that the
excessive caseload problem facing public defenders often amounts to
an unethical conflict of interest." Although many legal sources have
suggested that the excessive caseload problem is unethical, no
consensus has emerged as to how the problem directly equates to an
unethical conflict of interest under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 12 The time to reach that consensus is now. Second, courts
should declare that a lawyer's continued representation of a
defendant despite an excessive caseload conflict of interest violates
that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel under the standard established in Cuyler v. Sullivan.13 In
order to apply Sullivan, courts should equate excessive caseload
conflicts with the other types of unethical conflicts that the Supreme
Court has deemed fatal to the delivery of effective assistance of
Fairness, 36 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, 326 (2011) ("In the United States, over 80%
of those charged with felonies are indigent."); id. at 330 ("[R]esolution by guilty plea
occurs in the vast majority of cases, and trials in criminal cases are rare events . . . .")
(citing statistics from Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003)).
10. See F. Andrew Hessick III and Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J.
PUB. L. 189, 219-20 (2002) ("[T]he temptation to plead puts a burden on the ability of
defense counsel to advise defendants fully and impartially about the wisdom of a guilty
plea. As Professor Alschuler noted, 'This system subjects defense attorneys to serious
temptations to disregard their clients' interests . . . .' As a result, defense attorneys may
encourage defendants to plead guilty pursuant to offers that do not accurately reflect the
strength of the government's case."); Yermish, supra note 7, at 22 ("Perhaps the most
common, and significant, impact of the excessive caseload dilemma is the creation of the
'meet 'em and plead 'em' attorney, who has no meaningful communication with the client
before urging an uninformed guilty plea."); see also Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 742
(2011) (suggesting that satisfying Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standard is an
especially high burden when challenging pleas); see generally Perez, supra note 8
(suggesting alternatives to Strickland when evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims at the plea stage).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part II.
13. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); see infra Part III.C (discussing facts and
holding of Cuyler v. Sullivan).
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counsel, such as multiple representation conflicts.14 Ultimately, I
believe that this two-step method is the most direct way to
"constitutionalize" the excessive caseload problem and finally address
the injustice of underfunded indigent representation.
Part I of this article defines the excessive caseload problem on
two levels. First, Part L.A briefly chronicles the current status of
excessive caseloads on a national basis. On a narrower "case study"
level, Part I.B then examines the excessive caseload problem in
Florida, including the recent legislative and court responses to the
problem. Part II walks through the Supreme Court's ineffective
assistance precedent in order to show why viewing the excessive
caseload problem as a conflict of interest matters so greatly.
Part III.A draws upon multiple legal ethics sources to illustrate how
the excessive caseload problem is most properly characterized as an
unethical conflict of interest. Part III.B then shows how the excessive
caseload conflict should be evaluated under the ineffective assistance
standard in Sullivan instead of under Strickland. This article
concludes that viewing excessive caseloads as conflicts of interest is
one way to finally fund Gideon's promise of effective assistance of
counsel. 16
14. See infra Part III (arguing that the Cuyler v. Sullivan "adverse-effect" standard is
the appropriate way to evaluate excessive caseload conflicts given common characteristics
such conflicts share with multiple representation conflicts).
15. See infra Conclusion. At the very least, courts must reassert their exclusive right
to determine what qualifies as ethical legal representation-and stop legislatures from
doing it for them. See Bennett H. Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender
Workload: Managing the Systemic Obstruction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 104,
136-40 (2009) (showing how Florida statute likely violates separation of powers doctrine);
Logan, supra note 6, at 898 (discussing separation of powers issues associated with "an
aggressive effort by the Florida Legislature to limit the judiciary's constitutional oversight
and remedial authority").
16. In this article, I assume that Strickland currently would apply even in a
prospective relief scenario, as the Supreme Court stated in Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 740.
However, there are strong arguments for applying a different standard at the pre-trial
stage, especially if one views the excessive caseload problem as a "systemic" defect, as the
Eleventh Circuit has viewed it. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988);
see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1984) (finding presumption of prejudice
warranted giving systemic flaws in Arizona county's indigent defense system); see
generally Laurence A. Benner, When Excessive Public Defender Workloads Violate the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Without a Showing of Prejudice, ACS ISSUE BRIEF,
Mar. 2011, available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/bennerib-excessivepd
workloads.pdf (suggesting "a litigation strategy which avoids Strickland's prejudice prong"
by equating the excessive caseload problem with "the absence of counsel at a critical stage
of the proceedings").
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I. The Excessive Caseload Problem
In this Part, I use some "real world" context to define the
excessive caseload problem in two ways. First, I provide a
nationwide, surface-level overview of excessive caseload standards
and realities. Next, I offer a snapshot of the excessive caseload
problem in South Florida, where public defenders, the courts, and the
Florida legislature are battling over whether the excessive caseload
problem should be viewed as an unethical conflict of interest."
A. A National View of the Excessive Caseload Problem
The answer to when a public defender's caseload is "excessive"
depends on whom you ask-the attorney, the court, the state bar, the
legislature, or the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Drawing upon all of these sources and more, the American
Bar Association ("ABA"), in a carefully crafted 2006 Formal
Opinion, declared as follows:
If a lawyer believes that her workload is such that she is unable
to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the
representation of a client, she must not continue the
representation of that client or, if representation has not yet
begun, she must decline the representation . . . . When an
existing workload does become excessive, the lawyer must
reduce it to the extent that what remains to be done can be
handled in full compliance with the Rules.
Thus, whether a caseload is excessive depends primarily on
whether an individual lawyer subjectively believes that she cannot
represent another client consistent with her ethical duties, including
the duties of diligence, competence and loyalty."
17. In this article, I use the term "public defender" as shorthand for any defense
counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether that counsel is an attorney
working in a traditional state or county funded public defender office, a private attorney
appointed on a case-by-case basis, or an attorney working as part of a contract-based
system. For additional details concerning each model, see Baxter, supra note 7, at 348-49.
18. See ABA FORMAL OPINION 06-441, Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who
Represent Indigent Criminal Defendants When Excessive Caseloads Interfere with
Competent and Diligent Representation (May 13, 2006), at 4. In its Formal Opinion, the
ABA also stated that "whether a public defender's workload is excessive often is a
difficult judgment requiring evaluation of factors such as the complexity of the lawyer's
cases and other factors." Id. at 6.
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4
(communications), 1.7 (current client conflict of interest). 1.8 (current client conflicts of
interest in specific situations); See Brummer, supra note 15, at 106-07 ("Excessive
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Because the subjective ethical standard described above is
difficult for other stakeholders to grasp and evaluate, some respected
commentators have suggested more objective numerical "caps" on
the number of cases any single public defender can handle consistent
with her ethical duties. Perhaps the most commonly used and cited
numerical caseload standards are those initially established by the
National Advisory Commission ("NAC") on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals in 1973.20 Under these standards, which assume
an office with adequate support staff, a public defender should be
assigned in one year no more than 150 felony cases, 400 misdemeanor
cases, 200 juvenile delinquency petitions, 200 civil commitment
proceedings, or twenty-five appeals (or some combination thereof).21
As recently as 2002, the ABA again endorsed the NAC numerical
limits. 22
caseload is a caseload or workload that may reasonably be expected to materially interfere
with counsel's ability to provide assistance to existing clients. Excessive caseload is more
than a heavy caseload. Excessive caseload will actually or likely cause attorneys to
provide substandard representation that violates constitutional, ethical, and other
professional norms so that what should be done cannot be done.").
20. Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, Task Force on
Courts, Chapter 13, Standards 13.8, 13.9, The Defense (1973).
21. Id.
22. See ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a
Public Defense Delivery System (2002), at 5 n.19, available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf (stating that NAC's
"national caseload standards should in no event be exceeded, but the concept of workload
(i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity, support services, and an
attorney's nonrepresentational duties) is a more accurate measurement") (citations
omitted). According to the ABA, "[t]he Principles constitute the fundamental criteria
necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical,
conflict-free legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an
attorney." Id. For a discussion of other standards sources, see ABA, Gideon's Broken
Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice (2004), at 2 ("Many years ago the
ABA recognized the need for national standards regarding the provision of indigent
defense services. In 1967, four years after Gideon was decided, the ABA adopted the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services (now in its third edition).
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: The Defense Function soon followed in 1971, and
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases were adopted in 1989 and revised in 2003. Other organizations also have
adopted standards in the indigent defense area during the past three decades. The
National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA") adopted its Defender
Training and Development Standards in 1997, Performance Guidelines for Criminal
Defense Representation in 1995, Standards for the Administration of Assigned Counsel
Systems in 1989, Standards for the Appointment of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases in 1987,
Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Governmental Contracts for Criminal Defense
Services in 1984, and Standards and Evaluation Design for Appellate Defender Offices in
1980. The Institute of Judicial Administration collaborated with the ABA to create the
IJA/ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, totaling twenty-three chapters, adopted in 1979-1980.
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Fewer than ten states have adopted the NAC limits or other
similarly objective standards to define what is "excessive." 23  Other
states have legislated general principles,24 which then are overseen by
task forces25 or state commissions.26  In states without precise
numerical limits, it is up to the individual attorney or the supervising
attorney to refuse an appointment; often, the appointment then may
be given to a private contract attorney.27
Caseload standards, numerical or not, are not very telling if they
are merely aspirational versus reflective of reality. For example, if it
is true that almost two-thirds of state public defense offices are
exceeding caseload caps, even for felonies, 28 then perhaps the
standards are not particularly descriptive of reality.2 9 Instead, one
should examine what kind of excessive caseloads actually are
occurring and, as a result, what kind of assistance actually is (or, more
aptly, is not) being provided.
The ABA's comprehensive report, Gideon's Broken Promise,
summarizes collected testimony, data, and anecdotes regarding the
kinds of public defense being provided in all fifty states, as of 2004.30
The National Study Commission on Defense Services adopted Guidelines for Legal
Defense Systems in the United States in 1976, and the President's National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals adopted Chapter 13, Report of the
Task Force on the Courts, in 1973.").
23. See Baxter, supra note 7, at 357 (citing Lynn Langton and Donald J. Farole, Jr.,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of Public Defender Offices, 2007-Statistical Tables 6
(2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflpdo07st.pdf. The states are Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont,
and Wisconsin. Id.
24. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 30. For example, "in April 2002,
the Georgia State Bar adopted a set of six principles to guide reform of indigent defense in
the state" which later were incorporated into 2003 reform legislation. Id.
25. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 30-31 (describing efforts in
Texas).
26. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22.
27. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22 ("The primary models for furnishing
counsel include: (1) traditional 'public defender' programs, in which salaried attorneys
provide representation in indigent cases; (2) court assignments of indigent cases to private
attorneys who are compensated on a case-by-case basis; and (3) contracts in which private
attorneys agree to provide representation in indigent cases.").
28. See Langton and Farole, supra note 23 (cited by Baxter, supra note 7, at 355).
29. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 17 ("Caseloads are radically out
of whack in some places in New York. There are caseloads per year in which a lawyer
handles 1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases." (quoting Jonathan Gradess, Executive Director, New
York State Defenders Association)). Public defenders in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island and Nebraska offered similar reports. Id. at 17-18.
30. Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22.
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That report paints a rather bleak picture of the harms caused by the
excessive caseload problem and its root cause-inadequate funding."
Stories reported therein include thousands of clients pleading guilty
to misdemeanors without ever seeing a lawyer, public defender
offices with no investigator or expert services available, no motions
filed in over ninety-nine percent of cases,32 lawyers from the same
firm representing a defendant and the material witness 33 and a
defendant accused of shoplifting $72 worth of goods spending eleven
months in jail prior to seeing a lawyer.34 With state budget cuts on the
rise nearly everywhere, excessive caseloads are likely to get worse
before they get better; thus, calls for additional funding via the
legislature simply will not lead to results unless court ordered."
Accordingly, rather than exhaustively re-state what's already
reported elsewhere, I offer a case study of excessive caseloads in a
single jurisdiction from the past two years. This case study of Florida
lays the groundwork for later arguments that excessive caseloads are
properly viewed as unethical conflicts of interest.
B. The Excessive Caseload Problem in Florida
On August 5, 1963, a Bay County, Florida jury acquitted
Clarence Earl Gideon of felony theft.36  At trial, Mr. Gideon was
assisted by counsel appointed to him after the Supreme Court, in his
31. Other reported causes include overcriminalization, generally, and, more
specifically, the "war on drugs." See Baxter, supra note 7, at 382, 386 ("'Over the years
stricter drug laws and tougher sentences for drug offenses have contributed to a much
larger prison population. The number of people in prison for drug crimes has increased
from 40,000 (1980) to 500,000 (2010)."') (citing Rough Justice in America: Too Many
Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010, at 29; Marc Mauer, Tough
Sentencing Harder on Budgets Than on Crime, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, June 7,
2009, at Dl).
32. Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 19.
33. Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 19.
34. Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 22, at 23. See generally Benner, supra note
16 (providing more current anecdotal evidence).
35. See Baxter, supra note 7, at 353-54; Benner, supra note 16, at 12 ("A case in point
is Fresno County, California. In fiscal year 2006-2007, the institutional Public Defender
had seventy-six staff attorneys and nineteen investigators. Although it was already
handling felony and misdemeanor caseloads twice the maximum allowed by national
standards, by 2010 the office had been cut to only forty-eight staff attorneys and nine
investigators.").
36. See Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and In a Galaxy
Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure
Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 286
(2009) (excerpting facts from appellate brief for Gideon).
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prior appeal of his earlier conviction for the same crime, found that
denying Mr. Gideon free legal counsel in his first trial deprived him of
his Sixth Amendment right to "Counsel for his defense."" The
triumphant legal battle fought in Mr. Gideon's name was chronicled
in the book, movie and New Yorker profile often collectively referred
to as Gideon's Trumpet." Nearly fifty years after Mr. Gideon's
lawyer-assisted acquittal, Florida once again is the scene of an
important battle regarding effective assistance of counsel for indigent
defendants. In this modern version, the players in the drama remain
generally the same-indigent defendants, judges, and lawyers on both
sides-with one new and important addition. Much like how
Hollywood sequels often introduce a new villain, this Florida-based
Gideon sequel involves someone new as well-the state legislature.
This new battle between the Florida legislature and Florida courts is
detailed below.
Florida is discussed as a single state-level case study to provide
additional depth unavailable via a national-only overview. Also, it is
the only state in which a public defender's office actually challenged
the legislative two-step detailed above. Thus, the record is replete
with current statistics and ethical positions. Florida also is discussed
because of its connection to Gideon.
1. Statutory Bar on Excessive Caseload Conflicts
In a 2004 statute, the Florida legislature declared that no public
defender in Florida may withdraw from a case based solely on her
belief that her excessive caseload creates an unethical conflict of
interest. 9 "In no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the
public defender [or appointed counsel] based solely on the
inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender." 4 0
The statute essentially forces a public defender to continue
representing a client despite her personal belief that she cannot do so
37. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
38. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
39. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2009).
40. Id. Although the statute only purports to limit withdrawals, Florida courts have
interpreted it to apply to both withdrawals and refusals to accept new appointments. See
State v. Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d 798, 804 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("First, permitting
PD11 to withdraw by merely couching its requests as motions to decline future
appointments, would circumvent the plain language of section 27.5303(1)(d).").
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ethically because of an excessive caseload.41 Stuck in this position,
public defenders must sacrifice some clients in the interest of others
and, as documented elsewhere, often give some clients no effective
representation at all.42 The ultimate irony, of course, is that if Mr.
Gideon had been assigned counsel in 2011 instead of in 1963, he likely
would have plead guilty, regardless of his own innocence, because his
Florida public defender would have had no time or resources to
investigate his case and, ultimately, pursue a trial.43
2. Miami-Dade Public Defender Litigation
The lack of time and resources currently available to public
defenders in Florida was detailed by the Office of the Public
Defender for Miami and Dade Counties ("Miami PDO") in its recent
filings challenging the 2004 statute." Testimonial and other evidence
indicating a conflict of interest came from the public defenders
themselves, as well as from experts who opined as to whether the
workload of those public defenders violated ethical standards.45 The
Miami PDO challenged the Florida statute on two flanks: (i) first, in
the aggregate, via a motion to appoint other counsel in an entire
category of felony cases; and (ii) second, via a motion to withdraw
from a single felony case based on the court's guidance in rejecting
the first approach. Both approaches are chronicled below.
a. Miami PDO's Aggregate Approach
In June 2008, the Miami PDO filed twenty-one Motions to
Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases.46
As part of each motion, the public defender certified that there was a
41. See Logan, supra note 6, at 901 ("In short, the Florida Legislature impermissibly
sought to deny courts the power to allow withdrawal of counsel as a result of excessive
caseload, the adverse effects of which serve as a judicially recognized basis for conflict.").
42. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text (chronicling effects of excessive
caseloads).
43. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing resource shortages facing Florida public
defenders).
44. The Miami-Dade PDO is the fourth largest public defender office in the nation
and the largest in Florida. See Initial Brief of State of Florida, at 10, State v. Pub.
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Pub.
Defender's Motions to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Non-Capital Felony
Cases, No. 3D08-2272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), [hereinafter State Briefl available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/States-Brief_3dDCA.pdf.
45. All filings and opinions in the Florida litigation are conveniently available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/ExcessiveWorkloadPleadings.htm.
46. Id.
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conflict of interest based on excessive caseloads, which necessitated
the motion.47 Supporting testimony from public defenders included
admissions that "[a]ll of us are drowning," that working seven days a
week was "not enough," and that "we do not meet our responsibilities
to [our] clients."48 For example, one public defender declared that his
office "lacks the resources to interview out-of-custody clients until
after arraignment-a delay of several weeks-making it impossible to
counsel clients regarding early plea offers."4 9  Regarding post-
arraignment counsel, public defenders confessed that they have, at
most, one hour to speak with clients facing up to forty years in
prison.so Further, excessive caseloads left at least one public
defender:
* "unable to communicate with her clients"
* "unable to investigate and adequately prepare cases"
* "unable to file motions to advocate her clients'
positions," and
* "generally unable to be in multiple places at one
time.""
With respect to numerical standards, the Miami PDO showed
that lawyers "handled an average of over 436 noncapital felony cases
per year," which is more than twice as many cases as recommended.52
This anecdotal and statistical evidence led to the following expert
conclusion: "That's not legal representation. That's a warm body
repeating the State's offer."
The trial court consolidated the motions and ultimately agreed
with the Miami PDO. Specifically, the Florida trial court concluded
that refusing additional cases was proper because "future
appointments . . . [would] create a conflict of interest . . . under any
47. See State Brief supra note 44, at 1 ("The underfunding of the Public Defender's
office has created excessive caseloads such that PD-11 cannot ethically or legally accept
additional noncapital felony cases at this time . . . .").
48. See Response to Petition of Respondent, State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh
Judicial Circuit, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009), at 4-5 [hereinafter "Miami PD Brief'].
49. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 5.
50. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 5-6. That amounts to a little over one minute
of counsel per year of prison time faced.
51. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 4-8.
52. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 9.
53. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 10 (quoting report of Professor Norman
Lefstein).
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reasonable standard."" Accordingly, the trial court ordered the
public defenders' office to decline any more third-degree felony cases
in an effort to incrementally "lowe[r] caseloads as older cases are
resolved.""
After an initial stay of the trial court's order, Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal eventually reversed, finding serious fault
with the "aggregate determination" of excessive caseload conflicts."
The state appellate court also found that the public defenders'
refusals to accept additional appointments on the basis of excessive
caseload conflicts violated "the plain language" of Section
27.5303(1)(a) and (d)." The appeal of that case now sits unresolved
at the Florida Supreme Court.
b. Miami-Dade's Individualized Approach
Shortly after the Third District's ruling on the aggregate front, an
individual Miami PDO public defender, Jay Kolsky, filed a motion to
withdraw from a single felony case based on an excessive caseload
conflict of interest. Kolsky's motion also sought a declaration that
Section 27.5303(1)(d) was unconstitutional." In support of his
withdrawal, Kolsky showed that, in the fiscal year 2008-2009, he
"handled a total of 736 felony cases, in addition to 235 pleas at
arraignment."' Anecdotally, the evidence showed that Kolsky could
54. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 15-16 (citing Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Public Defender's Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed
Noncapital Felony Cases, State v. Loveridge, No. 08-1, Admin. Order No.: 08-14, 15 Fla.
L. Weekly Supp. 1078a (Sept. 3, 2008)).
55. Miami PD Brief, supra note 48, at 16.
56. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d at 798, 803 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) ("[Tlherefore, under the facts of this case, the determination of whether or
not a conflict exists under the [Rules Regulating the Florida Bar] must be made on an
individual basis."). Previously, the Third District Court of Appeal certified the case as
"presenting issues of great public importance for the Florida Supreme Court's
consideration" but the Florida Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. State
Brief supra note 44, at 9.
57. State v. Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d at 804.
58. See Assistant Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw and to Declare Section
27.5303(1)(d), Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional, State v. Bowens, (Fla Cir. Ct. Aug. 3,
2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Filed_08-03-09_Motion_
toWithdraw.pdf.
59. See infra Part III for further discussion of this argument.
60. See Order Denying Public Defender's Motion to Declare Section 27.5303(1)(d),
Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional and Granting Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw,
at 2-3, State v. Bowens, No. F09-019364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/BowensOrder_10-23-09.pdf (citing parties'
stipulation) [hereinafter Order].
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not "provide meaningful assistance" because he could hold only very
brief, nonconfidential conversations with his clients that did not
include discussing important matters such as "possible defense
witnesses and preservation of evidence."" With respect to the
individual case involving defendant Bowens, who faced a sentence of
life in prison, "[t]he unrebutted testimony [was] that Kolsky has been
able to do virtually nothing on [his] case."62 For example, Kolsky had
no time to obtain a possible witness list, to take a deposition, to visit
the crime scene, to consult with any expert, to prepare a mitigation
package, or to file any defense motions.' Along with his own motion-
based assertions, Kolsky offered a Memorandum of Law and
affidavits from his supervisor and from legal experts.6
The Florida Circuit Court granted Kolsky's motion to withdraw
but denied his motion to declare Section 27.5303(1)(d)
unconstitutional. Specifically, the court found that Kolsky had shown
that there was a substantial risk of prejudicing the defendant's rights
as a result of his excessive workload." In evaluating whether such
prejudice was present, the court noted that the "substantial risk"
portion of the standard necessitated a "forward looking" approach.66
In this case, Kolsky's workload was so excessive that there was a
substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant, Bowens, in the future.
Shortly after the granting of Kolsky's motion, the State
petitioned for certiorari from the pretrial order because it was
concerned that the Miami PDO soon would attempt to withdraw
from 4,000 to 6,000 cases. Eventually, the Third District Court of
Appeal reversed the trial court because "the law" required evidence
of "actual or imminent prejudice to Bowens' constitutional rights ...
separate from that which arises out of an excessive caseload."
Kolsky's "speculative" prejudice, including "the need to file a
continuance, [did] not rise to the threshold level of actual prejudice.""
61. See Order, supra note 60, at 3 (citing transcripts).
62. Order, supra note 60, at 4.
63. Order, supra note 60, at 4.
64. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Withdraw and to Declare
Section 27.5303(1)(d), Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional, at 2 n.1, State v. Bowens, No.
F09-019364 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Excessive
Workload/Filed_08-03-09_Memoof_Law.pdf.
65. Order, supra note 60, at 7-8.
66. Order, supra note 60, at 9.
67. State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis in
original).
68. Id.
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Whether such "actual prejudice" should be required under these
circumstances is addressed in Part II, below.
II. Why Being a Conflict of Interest Matters-The Supreme
Court's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Precedent
In Part I, I described the excessive caseload problem on a
national basis and illustrated how the problem has played out in one
jurisdiction, South Florida. In the Miami PDO case, public defenders
characterized the excessive caseload problem as a conflict of interest.
Before showing that their characterization was correct in Part III, it is
important to understand why being a conflict of interest matters.
That is the purpose of this Part II.
A. Establishing the Right to Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."69 Since declaring that the
right to the assistance of counsel for certain indigent criminal
defendants applied to the states, the Supreme Court occasionally has
stepped in to help clarify what kind of counsel does or does not
qualify as sufficient, initially settling on the concept of "effective
assistance."70 In this Part, I briefly discuss the Supreme Court's
general assistance of counsel cases before describing how those and
other cases dictate when conflicts of interest qualify as ineffective
assistance. As shown below, the Court's relatively limited guidance
has created some gaps open for interpretation and, sadly, for abuses."
The Supreme Court first determined that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was a fundamental right that applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1963.72 In Gideon v. Wainwright,
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
70. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("On the one hand,
uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions; but on the other hand defendants
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.").
71. This section provides a relatively cursory review of necessary guideposts. There
are many existing sources with more exhaustive reviews of the applicable case law. See,
e.g., Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2009) (providing history of right's evolution from Court's reliance
on Due Process to the Sixth Amendment).
72. The Court already had decided that indigent criminal defendants were entitled to
counsel in all federal proceedings. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (often
referred to as the "Scottsboro Boys" case); United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 68 (1942)
(discussed infra). However, for purposes of this article, it is not necessary to engage in a
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Clarence Gideon contended that a Florida trial court's refusal to
appoint counsel violated his fundamental right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment. At trial, Mr. Gideon requested counsel but his
request was denied, in large part because Florida courts only
appointed counsel to defendants facing the death penalty.74 Mr.
Gideon later was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison for
burglary." From prison, Gideon sought habeas corpus relief from the
United States Supreme Court." In its 1963 decision, the Court held
that the Florida state court's refusal to appoint counsel violated Mr.
Gideon's Sixth Amendment rights." The immediate consequence of
the Court's ruling for Mr. Gideon was a new trial, at which he was
acquitted.7 ' The long-term consequence for many states was that they
were required, for the first time, to provide free counsel to all
indigent defendants.
B. The Right to "Effective" and "Competent" Assistance
After Gideon, state courts routinely struggled with important
questions related to the procedural and substantive rights attendant
to the right to counsel. These questions included: (i) which
defendants are entitled to counsel (e.g., those that are accused of
felonies versus those accused of any crime), (ii) the time at which the
right to counsel should attach (e.g., prior to police questioning, at the
plea stage, or at some other time), and (iii) what kind(s) of assistance
must be provided in order to qualify as the "assistance of counsel."
This third category-the effective assistance "floor"-is the most
detailed discussion of most pre-Gideon cases because they were not based expressly on the
Sixth Amendment. See Chhablani, supra note 71, at 1-12.
73. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
74. Id. at 337.
75. Id. at 336 ("[Gideon] was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and
entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor.").
76. Id. at 337.
77. Id. at 344-45 ("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From
the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him. A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving
words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: 'The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."').
78. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 237 (1964).
79. Many states already were providing counsel to indigent defendants. See
Chhablani, supra note 71. at 6-10.
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relevant to this article. Thus, the "competence" and "conflicted"
aspects of effective assistance are discussed below.
In defining the level of substantive assistance required under the
Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court initially decided that
"effective" assistance must be provided.' What level of
"'competence" was required to be "effective" was further fleshed out
in McMann v. Richardson. In McMann, the defendants pled guilty
based on their lawyers' opinion that their earlier confessions could be
used against them at trial." Defendants later claimed that the
confessions likely could not have been used as evidence because they
were coerced. Thus, defendants asserted that their lawyers'
erroneous assessment of the confessions' admissibility deprived them
of the assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Instead, the Court reiterated that
''a plea of guilty in a state court is not subject to collateral attack in a
federal court on the ground that it was motivated by a coerced
confession unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his
attorney."8 In assessing whether defendants' counsel is "competent"
enough to be "effective," the proper inquiry is "whether the advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases" and not "whether a court would retrospectively
consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong."" In applying this
standard to counsel's alleged error in McMann-incorrect advice
regarding the admissibility of his coerced confession-the Court
noted that McMann's choice to waive trial naturally "entail[ed] the
inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably
competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken."85 To the McMann
Court, the mere fact that a court "might hold a defendant's confession
inadmissible in evidence, possibly by a divided vote, hardly justifies a
conclusion that the defendant's attorney was incompetent or
ineffective when he thought the admissibility of the confession
80. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[D]efendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel."). The McMann
Court also stated that "[it has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel." Id. (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955);
Glasser v.United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446
(1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
81. McMann, 397 U.S. at 762.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 771.
85. Id. at 770.
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sufficiently probable to advise a plea of guilty."6 Ultimately, because
the Court concluded that counsel's pre-trial advice regarding the
confession's admissibility did not involve "gross error" or "serious
derelictions," defendants could not seek reversal of their convictions
based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea stage."
Fifteen years after McMann, the Supreme Court attempted to
provide sweeping clarification regarding the effective assistance of
counsel standard in Strickland v. Washington." The defendant in
Strickland, who confessed to three murders, claimed that his trial
counsel was ineffective because his counsel failed to investigate or
proffer evidence regarding defendant's mental state and character
during the sentencing phase of his trial.89  In order to address
defendant's claim, the Supreme Court first had to decide what
showing a defendant must make to prove "actual ineffectiveness."9
The Strickland Court held that a defendant claiming
ineffectiveness must make a two-part showing of (i) deficient
performance by counsel, and (ii) actual prejudice." Under this
standard, counsel's errors must have been "so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair [and reliable] trial."2 Regarding part (i)'s
requirement of deficient performance, the Court refused to provide
''more specific guidelines," instead choosing to defer to "the legal
profession's maintenance of standards."3 Thus, whether a lawyer's
performance was deficient depends on whether it was "reasonabl[e]
under prevailing professional norms" given "all the circumstances." 94
In applying this standard to "acts or omissions" identified by a
defendant, courts are to avoid indulging in "hindsight" and instead
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance."95 Under part (ii)'s
requirement of actual prejudice, a defendant "need not show that [the
86. Id.
87. Id. at 772; 774. The Court also stated: "That a guilty plea must be intelligently
made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant's lawyer withstand
retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing." Id. at 770.
88. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
89. Id. at 675-76.
90. Id. at 684.
91. Id. at 687.
92. Id. at 687.
93. Id. at 688.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 689.
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deficiency] more likely than not altered the outcome."9 6 Instead, a
defendant must show that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors"
identified under (i), there is a "reasonable probability that . . . the
result of the proceeding would have been different" such that
"confidence in the outcome" has been undermined.' Only in very
limited circumstances-such as when one's lawyer was laboring under
a conflict of interest-would actual prejudice ever be presumed.8
C. Ethical Conflicts of Interest as Ineffective Assistance
In Strickland, the Supreme Court distinguished the conflict of
interest scenario from virtually all others. This distinction initially
was fleshed out in a much earlier case, Glasser v. United States.99 In
Glasser, three defendants accused of defrauding the government each
retained or were appointed separate counsel. When one defendant,
Kretske, fired his initial counsel, the trial court appointed Stewart, the
lawyer for one of the other defendants, Glasser, to represent Kretske
along with Glasser, over the objection of Glasser. The Supreme
Court held that this appointment of Stewart to represent both Glasser
and Kretske violated Glasser's Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the Court stated
that "the 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by
a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests.""
In applying this standard to the representation provided by
Stewart to Glasser, the Court noted Stewart's failure to cross-examine
a witness on behalf of Glasser because it would hurt Kretske, and also
noted Stewart's failure to object to certain testimony likely
inadmissible with respect to Glasser out of a "desire to avoid
prejudice to Kretske."' These examples of "trammeling" of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were especially troubling to the
Court because the trial court itself was "responsible for creating [the]
situation which resulted in the impairment of [Glasser's] rights."'l0
96. Id. at 693.
97. Id. at 698.
98. Id. at 692.
99. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). This case predates Gideon because it
involves the right to effective assistance of counsel in a federal trial.
100. Id. at 70.
101. Id. at 72-73.
102. Id. at 71.
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Thus, given the clear effects of a conflict of interest, neither Glasser
nor other similarly situated defendants need show any actual
prejudice. Instead, the Court stated, "[t]he right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts
to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." 03
In four key cases following Glasser, the Supreme Court
confirmed that conflicts of interest are to be analyzed separately from
other defects allegedly affecting the effectiveness of counsel. The first
of these four, Holloway v. Arkansas, was decided in 1978." In
Holloway, three defendants accused of the robbery of a restaurant
and rape of two restaurant employees were represented by a single
court-appointed attorney.'5 Counsel twice requested that the court
appoint separate counsel based on likely conflicts of interest, but the
trial court rejected each request.'" The Supreme Court held that the
trial judge's failure to appoint separate counsel, or to at least
adequately investigate the potential detrimental effects of the alleged
conflict, deprived the defendants of the effective assistance of
counsel.' 7 The Court emphatically concluded that "[w]henever a trial
court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection
reversal is automatic.',
08
Only two years later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
clarified the reach of Holloway and the obligations placed on trial
courts." In Sullivan, the Court reiterated that state trial courts must
"investigate timely objections to multiple representation.""o
However, the Sullivan Court also declared that state trial courts need
not "initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in
every case."' Instead, state trial courts may defer to "the good faith
and good judgment of defense counsel," who inherently "'is in the
best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict
103. Id. at 75-76.
104. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
105. Id. at 477.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 484.
108. Id. at 488.
109. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Sullivan, one of three defendants
represented by the same two retained lawyers claimed that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel due to the attorneys' conflicts of interest. Id. at 338.
110. Id.at346.
111. Id.
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of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial."" 2
Because no participant in Sullivan's trial objected to the multiple
representation, "nothing in the circumstances of [his] case indicate[d]
that the trial court had a duty to inquire whether there was a conflict
of interest.""' The Sullivan Court further held that a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest
who failed to object to the representation at trial must show that the
"conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation."H..4
In Wood v. Georgia, the Supreme Court identified a
circumstance in which a trial court would be obligated to inquire
further into the possibility of a conflict of interest absent a motion by
counsel."' In that case, two defendants accused of distributing
obscene materials were represented by their employer's lawyer, "who
may not have pursued their interests" due to the conflicting interests
of the employees and the employer."' The lower court's failure to
inquire into a possible conflict of interest likely violated the
defendants' Sixth Amendment "right to representation that is free
from conflicts of interest."" 7 Accordingly, the Court remanded the
case and ordered the court to determine whether there was an actual
conflict of interest and, if there was, to hold a new hearing "untainted
by a legal representative serving conflicted interests."" In doing so,
the Wood Court reiterated the mandate in Sullivan that a court's
"fail[ure] to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict exists"' deprives a defendant of
his Sixth Amendment rights." 9
Although the Court in Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood appeared
to emphasize a trial court's need to inquire into conflicts of interest
and to treat them differently when analyzing Sixth Amendment
claims, the Court also imposed an important limitation on such
claims-the requirement that a defendant show some "adverse
112. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. 475 at 485).
113. Id. at 347.
114. Id. at 347-48.
115. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981)
116. Id. at 271-72. The payment of legal fees by a third party inherently triggers
conflict of interest concerns under the rules of professional conduct. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2006).
117. See Wood, at 271 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, and Holloway, 435 U.S. at 481).
118. Id. at 273-74.
119. Id. at 273 n.18 and accompanying text.
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effect" of the conflict. This limitation was illustrated most profoundly
in the case of Mickens v. Taylor, decided by a 5-4 decision in favor of
the state.120 The defendant, Mickens, represented by court-appointed
counsel, Saunders, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.12 '
Mickens claimed that he had been deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel because, unbeknownst to Mickens, his lawyer in the
murder trial had been representing the victim, Hall, in an unrelated
proceeding at the time that Mickens allegedly murdered Hall.122 The
Supreme Court held that the mere existence of this conflict, which
was not raised by Mickens's counsel, was not enough to mandate
reversal of his conviction." Rather, in these circumstances, a
defendant also must "establish that the conflict of interest adversely
affected his counsel's performance." 24  Because Mickens failed to
show an adverse effect, his conviction was upheld. 25
D. Summary
Collectively, the cases discussed above reflect the Supreme
Court's view of what often fails to qualify as "assistance of counsel" in
an individual representation, i.e., representation that is incompetent,
ineffective or conflicted. For general ineffective assistance claims, the
defendant must show that the constitutionally infirm representation
caused "actual prejudice."'26 If a conflict of interest (at least one
involving joint multiple representation)127 is involved, the defendant
need only demonstrate an "adverse effect" on his counsel's
representation, a burden that is much easier to satisfy than "actual
120. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
121. Id. at 164.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 172-74.
124. Id. at 174; see Jeffrey Scott Glassman, Note, Mickens v. Taylor: The Court's New
Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy for Attorneys Faced with a Conflict of Interest, 18 ST. JOHN'S
J.L. COMM. 919, 976 (2004) ("Today, a defendant who was himself a victim of a trial
court's neglect of its duty to inquire into a conflict of interest that is known or should have
been known, must not only show that the conflict existed, but that it adversely affected the
representation.").
125. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174.
126. The Supreme Court reapplied these Sixth Amendment standards in its latest term
via the companion cases of Premo and Richter. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 742
(2011). Prerno involved an allegation of ineffective assistance at the plea stage based on
counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress a confession prior to defendant entering his
plea. Id.
127. See infra Part Ill.B (discussing whether multiple representation conflicts are and
should be the only conflicts that qualify).
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prejudice." Thus, whether an excessive caseload qualifies as a conflict
of interest significantly affects whether a post-hoc ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is likely to succeed.
III. The Excessive Caseload Problem is a Conflict of Interest
That Should Be Evaluated Under Sullivan
In Part I, I defined the excessive caseload problem and showed
how at least one legislature is trying to hide the problem. In Part II, I
explained why classifying the excessive caseload problem as a conflict
of interest matters under the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
cases. Specifically, if there is a conflict of interest, a defendant likely
must demonstrate only an adverse effect versus actual prejudice. In
this part, I show exactly how one could classify the excessive caseload
problem as an unethical conflict of interest using existing legal ethics
sources.
A. How the Excessive Caseload Problem is a Conflict of Interest
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") succinctly described the
relationship between excessive caseloads and ethical conflict
obligations when it stated, "Many public defenders fail to
acknowledge the conflict of interest that arises when excessive
caseloads force them to choose which of their clients will receive the
defense to which they are entitled."' 8 Like the DOJ, some state
courts and legal scholars have suggested that the time and resource
pressures placed on public defenders due to excessive caseloads could
be viewed as conflicts of interests under the ABA's Model Rules. In
this sub-part, I review and then synthesize these legal ethics sources
before concluding that the excessive caseload problem is best viewed
as a conflict of interest.
1. The ABA's Model Rules
Fundamentally, a conflict of interest is a conflict of duties. 29 If a
lawyer feels as though his duty (of loyalty, diligence, confidentiality,
or another) to one client conflicts with his duty to another person or
client, or with his personal interests, then he may face a conflict of
128. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ No. 185632,
KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 4 (2001), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/185632.pdf.
129. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Allocating Influence, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 683, 708
(2009).
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interest." Under the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a
"current client conflict" occurs if there is "direct adversity" or if there
is a "significant risk" that a lawyer's representation of one client will
be "materially limited" by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client. Similarly, a "personal interest conflict" arises if there is a
"significant risk" that a lawyer's representation of one client will be
"materially limited" by the lawyer's own "personal interest.""'
Using these conflict definitions, an excessive caseload would rise
to the level of a conflict of interest in one of two ways. First, an
excessive caseload could be viewed as a "current client conflict."
Specifically, if a public defender believes that there is a significant risk
that his ability to represent a criminal defendant is materially limited
by his obligations to represent the hundreds or even thousands of
other criminal defendants currently assigned to him, then the public
defender's excessive caseload triggers a current client conflict of
interest.132 Although it may be true that most attorneys often feel like
they face resource or time shortages, those other attorneys generally
have the power to prevent those natural time and resource pressures
from rising to the level of a conflict by turning down new matters, by
hiring additional attorneys, or by seeking help from fellow attorneys.
Public defenders likely have no such "anti-conflict" options available.
Rather, due to the legislative two-step detailed in Part II, they
generally must accept the cases assigned to them, no matter how
many other clients they already have. Thus, these public defenders
hold a unique position in the criminal justice system due to their
130. Underlying the lawyer-client relationship and the conflict of interest rules is an
expectation that the lawyer's representation will not be limited by his responsibilities to
another. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2008) ("Loyalty and
independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.
Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests.").
131. Id. at R. 1.7(a) ("Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent
a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.").
132. See Brummer, supra note 15, at 106-07.
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inherent lack of discretion.' Consequently, they are uniquely
vulnerable to excessive caseload conflicts.'
Second, as an alternative to the current client conflict option, an
excessive caseload could be viewed as a personal interest conflict. A
personal interest conflict arises when there is a conflict between the
client's interest and the lawyer's own personal interest, financial or
otherwise. In the case of excessive caseloads, the personal interest
conflict would be between the client's interest in competent, diligent
and conflict-free representation and the lawyer's interest in self-
preservation. In stark terms, the client has a significant interest in
exposing his public defender's unethical lack of competence and
diligence while the public defender herself has just as significant of an
interest in hiding those same unethical realities in order to continue
to have a job.' If a public defender's excessive caseload would
trigger a conflict under either of these two theories-current client
conflict or personal interest conflict-the Rules require the public
defender to obtain a waiver based on informed consent from the
client."
2. Judicial Opinions
In searching for possible applications of the ABA's conflict rules
to excessive caseloads, one naturally would turn next to case law. The
clearest judicial attempt to equate the excessive caseload problem to
an unethical conflict of interest occurred over twenty years ago in
Florida in In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the
Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender.'7 Several years prior to this
133. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 332 (1981) ("The public defender's
discretion in handling individual cases-and therefore his ability to provide effective
assistance to his clients-is circumscribed to an extent not experienced by privately
retained attorneys.") (citing Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 402-03 (7th Cir. 1978)).
134. The Model Rules already recognize that certain types of attorneys face unique
circumstances, and owe clients and the justice system unique duties, that other attorneys
do not face or owe. For example, the Model Rules detail special obligations applicable
only to criminal prosecutors. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2006)
("Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor").
135. See Brummer, supra note 15, at 118-19 ("Although the judges, lawyers and the
lawyer-supervisors are all lawyers who have personally committed themselves to
constitutional and ethical standards, most give precedence to their jobs consistent with
these norms and with getting along . . . . The system rewards incompetence and a lack of
integrity of this sort, and creates significant disincentives for those who might contemplate
making waves.").
136. See Brummer, supra note 15, at 132 (discussing waiver option).
137. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Order on
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decision, the Florida legislature had deleted a statutory provision
expressly providing "an independent mechanism for appointment of
counsel in lieu of the public defender."' State court judges
previously had relied upon the deleted provision when appointing
additional counsel to help deal with the excessive caseload problem.
In the 1990 Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, the Florida
Supreme Court found a new basis for appointing additional counsel
when the assigned public defenders faced an extreme excessive
caseload problem-an existing statute that authorized the
appointment of additional counsel in the event of a conflict of
interest.3 1
In order for state court judges to rely upon this other provision,
they would have to conclude that excessive caseloads created conflicts
of interest. The Florida Supreme Court connected the dots as
follows: "When excessive caseload forces the public defender to
choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants
he represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created."40 The court
also provided logistical advice to lower court judges using the conflict
of interest language: "[W]here the backlog of cases in the public
defender's office is so excessive that there is no possible way he can
timely handle those cases, it is his responsibility to move the court to
withdraw. If the court finds that the public defender's caseload is so
excessive as to create a conflict, other counsel for the indigent
defendant should be appointed . . . ."141
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals"]. In Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed an order appointing other counsel to file appellate briefs
that were delayed so long that defendants served sentences before briefs filed while those
represented by private counsel won appeals.
138. Id. at 1135.
139. Id. (In "section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1989), the legislature has provided an
appropriate mechanism to handle the problem of excessive caseload. That subsection
provides in pertinent part: '(3) If at any time during the representation of two or more
indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so
adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his staff
without conflict of interest, or that none can be counseled by the public defender or his
staff because of conflict of interest, it shall be his duty to move the court to appoint other
counsel. The court may appoint either: (a) One or more members of The Florida Bar,
who are in no way affiliated with the public defender, in his capacity as such, or in his
private practice, to represent those accused; or (b) A public defender from another circuit.
Such public defender shall be provided office space, utilities, telephone services, and
custodial services, as may be necessary for the proper and efficient function of the office,
by the county in which the trial is held.'").
140. Id. at 1135.
141. Id. at 1138.
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Because no other state shares Florida's unique history of "tit for
tat" between the legislature and the courts, one would expect no
other state to share the Florida Supreme Court's view of excessive
caseloads as conflicts of interest.142 However, in at least one other
state-California-courts are beginning to draw the same
comparison. In In re Edward S., a 2009 California appellate court
decision, the court declared that "a conflict of interest is inevitably
created when a public defender is compelled by his or her excessive
caseload to choose between the rights of the various indigent
defendants he or she is representing." 43 The court then relied upon
its conflict of interest finding to conclude that a juvenile defendant
had received substandard representation under Strickland in part
because his conflicted attorney did not investigate facts that would
discredit the victim's story.'" Similarly, in a 2010 case, the same
California court found that a contract-appointed public defender's
failure to obtain investigatory help due to extremely limited
investigatory resources was a conflict of interest that prejudiced the
defendant and others like him.145  Specifically, with only one
investigator to assist twelve public defenders, "[a]n accused person
whose defense requires investigation is as prejudiced by the excessive
caseload of the investigators the government provides as by that of
the public defenders."l 46
3. Legal Scholars
In addition to judges in the cases above, several legal scholars
have begun to equate public defenders' forced allocation of limited
resources to a conflict of interest. For example, in discussing conflicts
facing certain "cause lawyers," a category that includes some criminal
defense attorneys, Margareth Etienne has equated the process of
142. See Logan, supra note 6, at 887.
143. In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 746-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
144. Id. at 748.
145. People v. Jones, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 760-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); id. at 764
("Quinn's testimony put the trial court on notice of a conflict of interest that may
prejudice not just Jones, but many other indigent defendants in Lake County represented
by contract public defenders obliged to share inadequate investigative or other support
services.").
146. Id. at 765. The court further admonished public defenders for failing to raise the
excessive caseload conflict, stating: "A public defender who believes there is a genuine
basis upon which to make such withdrawal motion, but fails to do so, participates in the
denial of his or her client's Sixth Amendment rights." Id.
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divvying up one's time and resources as "prioritization."l4 David
Luban personalized this prioritization dilemma from the perspective
of a fictional public defender's internal debate: "[H]er dilemma of
aggressive defense is a problem of desperate triage; her moral
question is . . . , '[g]iven that many of my clients deserve aggressive
defense, how do I choose whom to provide with aggressive
defense?"'l 48 In discussing Luban, Darryl Brown suggested that the
question was not one of "whom do I aggressively defend," but more
likely "whom do I represent at all."l 49 In Brown's view, many public
defenders are engaging in the rationing of even the most basic facets
of representation.' Given the apparent inevitability of the excessive
caseload problem, Brown has suggested that public defenders at least
should recognize that what they are doing is rationing scarce
resources, and should develop some consistent principles to guide
that rationing."'
What these and other scholars essentially are saying is that a
public defender's obligation to provide some level of representation
to hundreds or thousands of clients often "materially limits" her
ability to provide representation to another client.'52 The prospect of
147. See Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1244-45 (2005) ("An indirect conflict of interest more commonly
arises when the interests of one client are not fully compatible with the interests of other
future clients who otherwise (and perhaps better) embody the lawyer's cause. This
generally means that lawyers have to prioritize among clients. The need to prioritize
among clients is common among criminal defense lawyers, particularly those with limited
resources.").
148. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1765 (1993). Luban further stated, "My own view is that she should utilize her scarce
resources on behalf of those clients who are in greater jeopardy and who are less
dangerous, rather than the other way around." Id.
149. See Darryl K. Brown, Correspondence: Criminal Procedure, Justice, Ethics and
Zeal, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2149 (1998) ("[R]esource scarcity is sufficiently great in
many settings that attorneys must trade off practices more basic than aggressive
techniques-often practices related to important fact investigation. Given the scarcity of
their time, attorneys cannot meet their professional obligations solely by rationing
aggressive defense tactics or sustaining high levels of zeal. They must also ration fact
investigation, and perhaps procedural litigation as well.").
150. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004).
151. Brown, supra note 149, at 815-28.
152. See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 913, 939-40 (2006) ("[Olverworked public
defenders . . . have a conflict of interest regarding any individual client since full
representation of that client would require skimping even further on the interests of
others.").
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rationing services forces a public defender to balance the interests of
one client against the interests of another-a problem that is a
quintessential conflict of interest.' When a public defender like
Miami PDO's Jay Kolsky must decide which of his deserving clients
to interview, to the exclusion of his many other deserving clients, he is
facing a conflict of interest.'m Similarly, when there is only enough
time to draft a single motion, and multiple clients' cases are worthy of
such a motion, the forced decision as to which client gets his time
involves a conflict of interest. 15
One way to address this type of problem is to do what Darryl
Brown suggests-acknowledge the rationing and develop some
criteria for allocating scarce resources properly using choice theory.'56
What Brown provides is an admirable recipe for "How to Do
Something Unethical in a More Professional Way." Although his
suggestions are quite helpful and practical as a "Band-Aid" of sorts,
they ultimately do not address the cause of the injury-inadequate
funding that leads to the excessive caseload conflict. In Part III.B
below, I offer a way to do just that.
B. Excessive Caseload Conflicts Should Be Evaluated Under Sullivan
Instead of Under Strickland
In Part II, I reviewed a critical dichotomy in the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Generally,
all defendants seeking reversal of a conviction on the basis of
153. Etienne, supra note 147, at 1256 ("[O]nce the attorney begins to weigh the
interests of the clients against the cause or that of other clients, the lawyer's representation
becomes materially limited."); Stephanie L. McAlister, Note, Between South Beach and a
Hard Place: The Underfunding of the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office and the
Resulting Ethical Double Standard, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2010) ("Consistent
underfunding of the Florida judiciary has caused a simultaneous increase in caseloads and
decrease in personnel in county public defender's offices. This forces attorneys in the
public defender's' offices into an ethical quagmire, requiring them to trade time spent on
one case for the interests of a different client.").
154. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Logan, supra note 6, at 899
("Finally, excessive caseloads threaten a systematic violation of the basic tenet of client
loyalty and capacity for independent judgment, namely that a lawyer 'shall not represent a
client if ... there is a substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client . . .. ').
156. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text; Brown, supra note 149, at 2154
("Once we recognize that attorneys may make strategic choices with important
substantive consequences among basic advocacy tasks as well as among tasks that define
the outer boundaries of zeal, we see a need for more guidance (and self-awareness) of
those decisions.").
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ineffective assistance must show that the representation was
defective. After that initial burden is satisfied, the cases diverge. If
the source of the defective representation was a conflict of interest,
then the defendant next must show that the defect had an "adverse
effect.""' However, if the source of the defective representation is
anything other than a conflict of interest, the defendant instead must
show "actual prejudice," a standard that has proven nearly impossible
to satisfy in the context of excessive caseloads.' Thus, if one
characterizes a defect as a conflict of interest under the first prong,
that characterization significantly reduces a defendant's burden under
the second prong.
Although the Strickland versus Sullivan dichotomy appears
relatively clear at first, the dividing line between the two is not
perfectly well-established. This is because whether the adverse effect
test applies to all conflicts of interest versus only to some kinds of
conflicts is a question that remains open. Thus far, the Supreme
Court has hinted but not definitively stated that only "joint
representation" conflicts of interest qualify for the easier-to-satisfy
"adverse effect" test.'59 In each of three seminal cases discussed
above-Sullivan, Glasser, and Holloway-the source of the conflict
was the attorney's joint representation of two or more co-defendants
accused of the same crime." These sources have led some to assume
157. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
158. See Recent Cases, Criminal Law-Conflicts of Interest-First Circuit Rules That a
Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict That the Judge Should Have Known About Must
Show Adverse Effect To Receive a New Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938, 944 (2002) ("The
[adverse effect] test is nearly impossible to satisfy, requiring a defendant not only to
imagine alternate strategies or trial tactics that his lawyer failed to pursue, but also to
connect that failure to the conflict.").
159. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) ("Whether Sullivan should be
extended to [successive conflict and other] cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of
this Court is concerned, an open question."); see Glassman, supra note 124, at 960-61.
160. See supra Part II. Additionally, Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifies as follows:
(1) Joint Representation. Joint representation occurs when:
(A) two or more defendants have been charged jointly under Rule 8(b) or
have been joined for trial under Rule 13; and
(B) the defendants are represented by the same counsel, or counsel who are
associated in law practice.
(2) Court's Responsibilities in Cases of Joint Representation. The court
must promptly inquire about the propriety of joint representation and must
personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of
counsel, including separate representation. Unless there is good cause to
believe that no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court must take
appropriate measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
449
that the only kind of conflict of interest that triggers Sullivan's
adverse effect test versus Strickland's actual prejudice test is a joint
representation conflict."'
Under the Model Rules, the joint representation type of conflict
falls within the broader category of concurrent client conflicts
described in Model Rule 1.7.162 The conflicts in Wood and Mickens,
however, are in two separate sub-categories. In Wood, the conflict
was between the clients' interest in loyal and zealous representation
and the lawyer's personal interest in payment from those clients'
employer, who was paying for their representation. That type of
conflict between the client's interest and the lawyer's personal
interest is specifically addressed in Model Rule 1.8(f).163 In Mickens,
the conflict was between the lawyer's duty to his current client,
defendant Mickens, and a former client, Hall (also Mickens's
victim).'" Yet another rule, Model Rule 1.9,16' addresses former client
conflicts like that in Mickens.'66
The value of this rules-based distinction was vitiated in Glassman, supra note 124, at 966-
68, given that the rule merely reiterates the Court's holding in Holloway.
161. Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("First, Cuyler, like
all the other Supreme Court cases that have discussed a lawyer's conflict of interest, solely
concerned the representation of multiple clients. The Supreme Court has not expanded
Cuyler's presumed prejudice standard beyond cases involving multiple representation.");
id. at 1265 n.8 (grouping simultaneous joint representation with serial representations into
single category of multiple representation).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 states:
A concurrent conflict of interests exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client;
or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) states:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required
by Rule 1.6
164. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 164.
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 states:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
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The fact that Wood and Mickens involve conflicts other than
joint representation means that the pathway to Sullivan may not be
closed to excessive caseload conflicts. 67 Given the Supreme Court's
skepticism about whether Sullivan applies to conflicts other than
concurrent representation conflicts, however, merely pointing to
Wood and Mickens likely is insufficient. Rather, in order for my
theory for constitutionalizing funding for Gideon to work, courts must
not only characterize the excessive caseload problem as a conflict of
interest; they also must find that it is the exact kind of conflict of
interest that automatically triggers Sullivan versus Strickland. The
case for excessive caseload conflicts qualifying for Sullivan's adverse
effect test would be much stronger if the excessive caseload conflict
could be compared favorably to the multiple representation conflicts
at the heart of Sullivan, Glasser and Holloway. Fortunately, the
excessive caseload conflict shares much in common with a more
typical joint representation conflict. Four of these shared
characteristics are discussed below.
First, the most feared harm of joint representation conflicts-the
"gag effect"-is even more pronounced with excessive caseload
conflicts." The Supreme Court has described this silencing effect as
follows:
(b)A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly
was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a
client, or when the information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules
would permit or require with respect to a client.
166. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 164.
167. But see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (finding that "conflict" between
defendant wanting to perjure himself and lawyer who insisted on withdrawal was not the
kind of conflict of interest contemplated in Sullivan).
168. See Joe Margulies, Criminal Law: Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 703 (1989) ("One source of incompetent counsel is
the joint representation of conflicting interests. Its evil is the gag placed on counsel, quite
apart from his or her own abilities. In fact, it is the attorney's devotion to one client which
inevitably commands that he or she sacrifice another."). This gag effect has been
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Joint representation of conflicting interests is susgect because of
what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing.
[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the
evil-it bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to
possible170pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process.
A public defender laboring under a multiple representation
conflict suffers from a temptation to sacrifice the interests of one
client in order to better represent the interests of the other client.
However, for a public defender laboring under an excessive caseload
conflict, that possibility of sacrifice is more than a temptation-it is a
certain and necessary evil."' As the examples above show, public
defenders like Jay Kolsky frequently refrain from doing many things
that would benefit their clients.172 Thus, if the Sullivan rule applies to
multiple representation conflicts because they cause attorneys to
refrain from doing certain things on behalf of a client, that rule should
apply with equal (if not more) force to excessive caseload conflicts."'
As the Court stated in Holloway, "[t]he mere physical presence of an
described more mildly as "soft pedal[ing]." See Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's a Crowd: A
Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 449 n.246 (2001) (citations
omitted).
169. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
171. Some would say that Mr. Kolsky and similarly situated public defenders are
failing to file motions or cross-examine someone because they are "pulling punches." See
Etienne, supra note 147, at 1255 ("The problem of 'materially limited' conflicts is
sometimes described as one of lawyers 'pulling [] punches' or 'soft-pedaling' the
representation. In a sense, this is precisely what is at issue when criminal defense lawyers
use the impact litigation strategy of seeking test cases in which to raise to particular issues
or when they decline to raise issues in certain cases so as to reserve their credibility for
more deserving cases.").
172. See Margulies, supra note 168, at 706 ("This evil also includes the neglect of
pretrial investigations, legal research, and consultation with clients.").
173. At least one court and commentator agree with this connection. See Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 424 n.450 (1995) (citing State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374,
1381 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that "[t]he insidiousness of overburdening defense counsel is
that it can result in concealing from the courts, and particularly the appellate courts, the
nature and extent of damage that is done to defendants by their attorneys' excessive
caseloads"); Suzanne E. Mounts, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 221, 234 (1986) (pointing out that "[w]hen errors are of
omission rather than commission, it is often difficult for courts to see the effect")).
[Vol. 39:2452
Winter 20121 EXCESSIVE CASELOADS AS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the
advocate's conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on
crucial matters."" 4 That admonition should apply equally whether
the source of that seal is an inner temptation or a state's lack of
funding.
A second parallel between Sullivan-worthy multiple
representation conflicts and excessive caseload conflicts is that both
are state-created."' In Sullivan, the Supreme Court distinguished
conflict scenarios from other sources of ineffective assistance in part
because they are like scenarios for which "the prosecution is directly
responsible," and because they are "easy for the government to
prevent."' 6  This emphasis tracked that of Glasser, where the trial
court was "responsible for creating [the] situation which resulted in
the impairment of [Glasser's] rights.""' This same "government-
created" rationale supports extending Sullivan to excessive caseload
conflicts. Excessive caseload conflicts are government-created
conflicts because they generally result solely from inadequate
government funding." Excessive caseload conflicts also are "easy for
the government to prevent" because they can be erased by
appropriating adequate funding. At least one state court has linked
excessive caseload conflicts (albeit for investigators, rather than the
public defenders themselves) with the Sullivan standard for this very
"state-created" reason.179 Similarly, Justice Breyer, in his Mickens
174. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490.
175. Some call these defects "systemic" or "structural." If a defect is structural, then
prejudice automatically may be presumed and a defendant does not even need to show
"adverse effect." See Margulies, supra note 168, at 711 (citing Luckey v. Harris, 860 F. 2d
1012 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 495 U.S. 957 (1990); Benner, supra note 16, at 3 n.17.
176. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
177. United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
178. Other government-created causes include overcriminalization. See Baxter, supra
note 7, at 382, 386.
179. People v. Jones, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 767 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) ("Although
we rely on the conventional guidelines regarding prejudice, the inadequacy of investigative
resources provided contract public defenders by Lake County arguably eliminates Jones's
need to demonstrate prejudice. As explained in Strickland, prejudice is presumed in
certain contexts in which the state significantly interferes with counsel's assistance or
counsel was otherwise prevented from assisting the accused at a critical stage of the
proceedings. The effective denial of investigative assistance to a class of accused persons
certainly constitutes state interference with counsel's assistance. It is 'reasonable for the
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice' where there is
such interference not only because the government created the problem, but also due to
'he ability of trial courts to make early inquiry.' It may also be that '[p]rejudice in these
circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost."')
(citations omitted).
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dissent, suggested that the conflict in Mickens warranted reversal
because "the Commonwealth '[had] created a structural defect
affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself."'" Finally, as much as the
"government-created" factor ties together multiple representation
conflicts and excessive caseload conflicts, it also distinguishes them
from other personal conflicts, such as those caused by a lawyer having
sex with client or a lawyer's advance book deal.18 1
Third, equating excessive caseload conflicts with multiple
representation conflicts honors the Court's emphasis on deferring to
counsel's judgment when evaluating Sixth Amendment claims. As
noted above, the Holloway Court stated that defense counsel "'is in
the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a
conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a
trial."'82 The Strickland Court cited that same passage from
Holloway, adding that state trial courts may defer to "the good faith
and good judgment of defense counsel." Most recently, in Premo,
the Court reiterated that "the standard for judging counsel's
representation is a most deferential one" because "[u]nlike a later
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client,
with opposing counsel, and with the judge."" Ultimately, many of
the Court's Sixth Amendment cases are built on this same foundation
180. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 209 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).
181. These other types of conflicts are the "lighter" conflicts that triggered skepticism
from Justice Scalia in Mickens and from the Fifth Circuit in Beets. See Mickens, 535 U.S.
at 174-75 (criticizing lower courts that "have applied Sullivan 'unblinkingly' to 'all kinds of
alleged attorney ethical conflicts,' Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc)" and for "invok[ing] the Sullivan standard not only when (as here) there is a conflict
rooted in counsel's obligations to former clients, see, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775,
797-799 (5th Cir. 2001); Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 858-60 (11th Cir. 1999);
Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Young, 644 F.2d
1008, 1013 (CA4 1981), but even when representation of the defendant somehow
implicates counsel's personal or financial interests, including a book deal, United States v.
Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1980), a job with the prosecutor's office, Garcia v.
Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1194-95, 1198 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994), the teaching of classes to Internal
Revenue Service agents, United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40-42 (1st Cir. 1991), a
romantic 'entanglement' with the prosecutor, Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 935-41
(9th Cir. 2001), or fear of antagonizing the trial judge, United States y. Sayan, 296 U.S.
App. D.C. 319, 968 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1992).").
182. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486-86 (1978) (quoting State v. Davis,
514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973)).
183. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980).
184. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011).
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of deferring to counsel's judgment. If defense counsel believes that
he is laboring under an excessive caseload conflict of interest that
deprives him of his ability to represent a defendant, then presumably
a court must defer to his judgment. To instead use Strickland and its
progeny as a basis for undermining counsel's judgment would be an
absurd deviation from the Court's primary Sixth Amendment
rationales.
A fourth way in which excessive caseload conflicts compare well
with multiple representation conflicts is that recognizing both types of
conflicts is consistent with yet another fundamental policy rationale
supporting Strickland-the need to ensure a fair trial leading to
confidence in the result.' The Court's emphasis on ensuring a fair
trial goes all the way back to Powell v. Alabama, when the right to
counsel was based on the Due Process Clause.'" In Powell, the Court
stated that a failure to be heard is what triggers a constitutional
violation.'" With an excessive caseload conflict, a defendant often
cannot be heard by his own lawyer, let alone have his position heard
by the court.'"
In Cronic, the Court declared that "the right to the effective
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because
of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair
trial."'" Similarly, the Strickland Court stated that "[t]he purpose of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the
outcome of the proceeding."'" Excessive caseload conflicts often
strike at that confidence even deeper than multiple representation
185. Perez, supra note 8, at 1571 ("Additionally, the Court's recognition of the right to
effective assistance of counsel goes beyond the 'fair trial' context 'to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results."') (citations omitted); id. at 1561 ("In this way,
the right to counsel protects more than simply a fair trial, for it also 'serves to protect the
reliability of the entire trial process."') (citation omitted); id. at 1569 ("Of course the right
is designed to ensure a fair trial, but 'it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded
so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair."') (citations omitted).
186. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70-71 (1932) ("[I]t is equally true that that
provision was inserted in the Constitution because the assistance of counsel was
recognized as essential to any fair trial of a case against a prisoner.").
187. Id. at 68-69 ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.").
188. See supra Part 1.
189. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
190. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); Glassman supra note 124
(noting that reversal is the only remedy that can "'maintain public confidence in the
fairness of the procedures employed in capital cases') (quoting Stevens, J., dissent in
Mickens).
455
conflicts do. Although it is conceivable that an attorney could
internally block out a loyalty issue and potentially serve two masters
adequately, it is impossible for a public defender conflicted by
excessive caseload to make more time in the day in order to represent
his hundreds of masters. As Joe Margulies so eloquently stated, "the
'mischief' [of] systemic resource deprivation" present with excessive
caseload conflicts is "no less a threat to a fair trial than outright denial
of the right to counsel."1 91
Conclusion
Increasingly, states have interpreted the obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel as the obligation to provide a "warm
body repeating the state's offer." 92 Despite this reality, the actual
standard remains the same. In order to succeed on a Sixth
Amendment claim, a defendant must show "actual prejudice," unless
his attorney was laboring under a conflict of interest, in which case
the defendant need only show an "adverse effect." A public
defender's excessive caseload often should be viewed as a conflict of
interest worthy of this lower burden for the reasons stated in Part III
above. The next step depends on whether judges and public
defenders are ready to admit that these unethical conflicts exist.
If public defenders are ready to risk their financial and ethical
standing, they should stand up and file motions to withdraw, like the
courageous public defenders of the Miami PDO have done. Doing so
would place each judge in an uncomfortable yet proper position, in
which he would have two options: (i) grant the motion, and force the
state to spend additional money, or (ii) deny the motion, and face the
prospect of a later reversal under Sullivan, because he now "knows or
reasonably should know" that the conflict exists. Exercising either
option essentially would force each state legislature to do what is long
overdue-finally provide adequate funding for indigent defense.
191. Margulies, supra note 168, at 688.
192. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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